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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATIONS RESTRICTING
PRISONER CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MEDIA
INTRODUCTION

In Procunierv. Martinez,' the Supreme Court determined that censorship 2 of direct personal mail of prisoners restricts the first amendment
right to free speech 3 of both prisoners and their correspondents.4 It held
that censorship of prisoner mail, in the form of opening, reading or confiscation, is justified only if it furthers one of three substantial government interests concerning prisons: security, order or rehabilitation of
inmates.5 In addition, the censorship must be no greater than is necessary to effectuate the governmental interest involved.6
In response to the Court's directive in Martinez, state prison authorities have promulgated regulations providing for a variety of treatments of
prisoner mail, depending on the governmental interests implicated."
The specific treatment to be given any piece of prisoner correspondence
depends on its classification in prison regulations as either general or
1. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
2. The essence of censorship is "'interference with... intended communication.'"
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 40809); see, eg., Admin. Regulations, No. 750, § IV C (State of Nevada Dep't of Prisons,
Aug. 8, 1984) ("Censorship refers to... 1. Reading of mail except that which is seen
during inspection; 2. Deleting portions of a letter, 3. Returning the letter either in its
entirety or in part to the sender; and 4. Removing printing or pictures or rendering any
portion of the contents unintelligible."); Policy Statement, Manual of Policies and Procedures, No. 02-00-105, § la, Offender Correspondence (Indiana Dep't of Corrections, Jan.
1, 1984) ("censorship: any action taken by departmental staff which results in the restricting, deletion or withholding of an item of correspondence or a publication, or a part of an
item of correspondence or publication"); see also Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 116
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding it functionally impossible to separate inspection from
censorship).
3. U.S. Const. amend. I.
4. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1965)); accord Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 864-65 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408); Vester
v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179, 1181 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987); Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 1101, 1111 (N.D. Ga.
1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1056 (1977).
5. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 412-13.
6. See id. at 413.
7. See, e.g., Policy Statement, Manual of Policies and Procedures, 02-00-105, Offender Correspondence (Indiana Dep't of Corrections, Dec. 16, 1983) (department's mail
system designed to maintain prisoner's outside connections to ease reassimilation upon
release, while at the same time protecting the safety of the general public, the order and
security of the prison, and safety of the inmates); Wash. Admin. Code § 13748-010
(1983) (correspondence regulations serve to maintain "the safety, security, and discipline
of adult correctional facilities"); Admin. Regulations, No. 750 (State of Nevada Dep't of
Prisons, Aug. 8, 1984) ("Correspondence between inmates and persons outside the Department is encouraged for the purpose of maintaining family ties and other positise
contacts in the community. Any restrictions placed on inmate correspondence must be
for the protection of the security of the institution and to prevent injury. .. ")
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Prison officials may open, read, and even

confiscate general correspondence, such as a prisoner's letters to or from
family members or friends, without violation of the first amendment
rights of the prisoner or his correspondents. 9 In contrast, the Constitu.tion protects free speech contained in "privileged" correspondence between an inmate and those directly involved with, or responsible for, his
incarceration, 10 such as attorneys, 1 governmental agencies,1 2 and
courts. 3 4Mail to or from these privileged correspondents cannot be
censored. '
Inmate correspondence with the news media' 5 does not fit easily
8. See Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1983); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.
1978); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1977); see, e.g., Manual of Policies
and Procedures, No. 02-00-105, Offender Correspondence §§ 7 and 8 (Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, Jan. 1, 1984) (providing for differing treatment of general and confidential or
privileged correspondence); Admin. Regulations, No. 750, § V D (State of Nevada Dep't
of Prisons, Aug. 8, 1984) (requiring presence of inmate during inspection of privileged
correspondence, while no such requirement exists for inspection of general correspondence); Wash. Admin. Code § 137-48-030 (1983) (general mail may be inspected at any
time, but mail pertaining to legal matters may be inspected only in the presence of the
inmate and shall not be read without a search warrant).
9. See Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 208 n.3, 211 (6th Cir. 1983) (reading
incoming and outgoing general correspondence, and censoring prohibited statements
therein, does not violate the constitutional rights involved); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d
997, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding censorship of both incoming and outgoing general correspondence as constitutionally permissible); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364,
374 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding prison officials constitutionally may monitor inmate general
correspondence); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 424-26 (7th Cir. 1977) (spot-checking
and reading all incoming and outgoing nonprivileged mail does not violate constitutional
rights); see also prison regulations cited supra note 8.
10. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) ("correspondence
from attorneys-at-law, courts, government officials ... is privileged mail, and scrutiny of
it by prison officials is restricted under the First and Sixth Amendments"); Stover v.
Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D. Conn. 1976) ("the channels of communications to and
from those agencies with important and immediate responsibility for the fact of an inmate's incarceration remain entirely free of prison staff surveillance, except for the minimum intrusion of opening in the inmate's presence to check for contraband without
reading contents"); Comment, A Giant Step Backwards: The Supreme Court Speaks Out
On Prisoners' First Amendment Rights, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 352, 354 (1975) ("inmate
correspondence with courts, public officials, and lawyers has received preferential
treatment").
11. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977).
12. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (parole and probation
departments); Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D. Conn. 1976) (Justice Department and state and local prosecuting authorities).
13. See Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 322.
14. See cases cited supra note 10; see, e.g., Admin. Regulations, No. 750, §§ V F 1(d)
and V D2(b) (State of Nevada Dep't of Prisons, Aug. 8, 1984); Policy Statement, Manual
of Policies and Procedures, No. 02-00-105, Offender Correspondence (Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, Dec. 16, 1983).
15. The Federal Bureau of Prisons defines media as:
Persons who are substantially employed in the business of gathering or reporting news for (a) a newspaper qualifying as a general circulation newspaper in
the community to which it publishes, (b) news magazines having a substantially
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within either the general or privileged category. 6 Although the media is
not directly responsible for the prisoner's incarceration, they may provide an alternative means of communications with those who are. The
answer depends upon interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Procunierv. Martinez 7 and Pell v. Procunier.18 In Pell, the Court held
that personal contact with members of the media could be restricted' 9
because written correspondence afforded prisoners an alternative means
of communication ("alternative means test") 20 with these correspon-

dents. Some courts hold that media mail is privileged and, as such,
2

should not be subject to censorship regulations under the Martinez test. '
One court finding prisoner correspondence with the media to be nonprivileged,2 2 however, asserts that the alternative means test of Pell allows
media mail to be censored. 3

This Note advocates that inmate correspondence with members of the
media should be classified as privileged in order to protect the first
amendment rights of both prisoners and their correspondents. Part I of
this Note discusses general restrictions on the free speech of prisoners
and the classification of inmate mail. Part II addresses the conflict concerning the classification of prisoner correspondence with the media as

privileged, concludes that a proper reading of Supreme Court guidelines
in this area should result in a finding that media mail is privileged, and
warns of the possible chilling effect of a finding to the contrary on both
prisoners and their correspondents.
national circulation being sold by newsstands to the general public and by mail
circulation, (c) national or international news services (d) radio and television
news programs of stations holding Federal Communication Commission
Licenses.
U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 1220.6/7300.96, Inmate

Correspondence Interviews With Representatives of the Press and News Media,
§ 4(a)(1), June 10, 1974 (quoted in Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 481 n.28 (5th Cir.
1976)).
16. Compare Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 759 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding media
mail privileged) with Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
media mail not privileged). Prison regulations also differ in their treatment of media
mail. Compare Policy Directive, No. PD-BCF-63.03 (Mich. Dep't of Corrections, March

19, 1985) (treating media mail as privileged correspondence) with Policies and Procedures, No. 16.1 (State of Maine Dep't of Corrections, May 30, 1986) (excluding media
mail from privileged category).
17. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
18. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
19. See id at 827-28.
20. See id.; infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
21. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1976); Burton v. Foltz, 599
F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
22. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986).
23. See Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1306-07 (without discussing the alternative means avail-

able, the Seventh Circuit stated that the inmates have other avenues for communicating
with the general public).
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RESTRICTIONS ON PRISONER RIGHT To CORRESPOND

Prior to Procunierv. Martinez,24 the judiciary avoided involvement in
prison administration issues,25 citing reasons that included separation of
powers,26 the benches' inability to deal with prison administrative
problems,2 7 the difficulty of prison administration,28 prison officials' expertise in this area,2 9 federalism,3 ° and the notion that such officials
should be afforded deference. 3' As a result, prior to 1974, lower courts
generally utilized a variety of approaches to the problem of censorship of
prisoner mail,32 most relying on rationales involving "prisoner's
rights."' 33 For example, one prohibited censorship of mail between an
34
inmate and the court based on the inmate's right of access to the courts,
while another forbade censorship of mail between an inmate and his attorney based upon the inmate's right to counsel.35
In 1974, the Supreme Court applied the first amendment freedom of
speech clause to a prisoner mail issue for the first time in Procunier v.
Martinez.3 6 Under the Martinez test, prisons may place a restriction on
24. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
25. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (lst Cir. 1978); Main Road v. Aytch,
522 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1975); Cole v. Snow, 586 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D. Mass.
1984), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 771 F.2d 556 (1st
Cir. 1985).
26. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 115 (1987); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 209-10 (6th Cir.
1983); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 371; Wooden v.Norris, 637 F. Supp. 543, 555 (M.D. Tenn.
1986).
27. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Main Road, 522 F.2d at 1085.
28. See Wolff v.McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); Bumgarner v. Bloodworth,
768 F.2d 297, 300-01 (8th Cir. 1985).
29. See Pell v.Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d
1015, 1018 (2d Cir. 1985).
30. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Main Road, 522 F.2d at 1085; Hall v.Maryland,
433 F.Supp. 756, 778-79 (D.Md.1977), affirmed in part, rev'd and remanded in part on
other grounds sub nom. Carter v.Mandel, 573 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1978).
31. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321
(1972) (per curiam).
32. Some courts deferred to prison officials when confronted with constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74
(4th Cir. 1964). Another required that censorship of inmate mail be supported by a rational and constitutionally accepted concept of a prison system. See Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane) (censorship of mail between an inmate and his
attorney does not satisfy this standard), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). Others have
required a "compelling state interest" to justify censorship of inmate mail. See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 530, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1968) (denying prisoner the right to
receive newspapers and magazines is not justified by a compelling state interest); Fortune
Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison restriction on prisoners' right to receive newsletter not supported by a compelling state interest).
33. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974).
34. See Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 906-07 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905
(1966).
35. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
36. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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prisoner mail if it furthers the governmental interests of security, order,
or rehabilitation3 7 and is no greater than necessary to effectuate that legitimate governmental interest.38
In developing this two-part analysis, the Court emphasized the first
amendment interests of persons corresponding with prisoners and did
not distinguish between authors and recipients of inmate correspondence. 39 The Martinez Court also noted that prison officials must be
given some latitude in this area in order to administer their duties properly.' Thus, under Martinez, prison officials need not show that harm is
certain to follow if a certain piece of inmate mail is left uncensored.4"
Safeguards such as notification of censorship to intended recipients of
censored mail, along with an opportunity to object,42 however, must be
in place to control the discretion exercised by prison officials over censorship of prisoner mail.43
In the years following the Martinez decision, courts have justified a
variety of prisoner mail restrictions based on the existence of at least one
of the three governmental interests enumerated by the Martinez Court.'
For example, some have found that prisoner correspondence implicates
security interests because it provides the opportunity for infiltration into
the prison of contraband4 5 and communications, such as escape plans,
likely to threaten institutional security." Others have cited the interest

in maintaining prison order to justify censorship, reasoning that the

mails could be used to stir up prison violence, 47 create institutional ten37. See idL at 413-14.
38. See id.

39. See id at 408-09 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305-07
(1965)).
40. See id. at 414; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security....
41. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 414.

42. See id.; Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 581 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Martinez, 416
U.S. at 418-19), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 466
(5th Cir. 1976) (discussing Martinez).
43. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 417-18; Pittman v. Hutto, 448 F. Supp. 61, 62 (E.D. Va.
1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
44. See, eg., Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 210-11 (6th Cir. 1983); Feeley v.
Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 374 (Ist Cir. 1978); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 426-27 (7th
Cir. 1977).
45. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974); Parrish v. Johnson, 800
F.2d 600, 603 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Guajardo v. Estelle, 568 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D.
Tex. 1983) (citing Texas Department of Corrections' definition of contraband as "physical items 'that present a substantial danger to the safety or security of stafl inmates, or
the institution' ").

46. See Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1985) (escape plans), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987); Heimerle v. Attorney Gen.,

575 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (escape and riot plans), revid on othergrounds,
753 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. See Safley, 777 F.2d at 1312 (riots); Cavey v. Levine, 435 F. Supp. 475, 482-83 (D.
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sion,4 8 and thwart the enforcement of discipline.4 9 Last, courts have
pointed to the threat against prison rehabilitative efforts evident in unrestricted mail to "person[s] whom the prison officials believe [would]
deter rehabilitation." 5 Because prisoner correspondence implicates the
5 ' little
three governmental interests enumerated by the Martinez Court,
52
mail.
prisoner
most
to
constitutional protection is available
Two categories of prisoner mail have developed, however, as courts
and prison officials have faced the issue of censorship: general or nonprivileged correspondence, 53 and privileged correspondence. 5 4 General
correspondence, such as prisoner mail to and from family, friends or
clergy, 55 may be opened, read and even confiscated by prison officials
without violating
the first amendment rights of prisoners or their
56
correspondents.
Privileged correspondence requires different treatment; when inmate
mail is handled by prison officials, the prisoner's constitutional right of
access to courts, 57 which includes the prisoner's right to effective assistance of counsel 58 and to petition the government for redress of grievances, 59 must receive special protection.' Consequently, correspondence
Md. 1977) (citing Mims v. Shapp, 399 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976)), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir. 1978).
48. See Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179, 1183 (4th Cir. 1986) (limiting correspondence between inmates in different penal institutions "as a means of reducing institutional
tensions"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987).
49. See Martinez v. Oswald, 425 F. Supp. 112, 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[E]xtensive
press attention to an inmate may result in his becoming a 'public figure' within the prison
society with a disproportionate degree of notoriety and influence among his fellow inmates. Because of this notoriety and influence, these inmates may become the source of
disciplinary problems.") (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 831-32 (1974)).
50. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (justifying restrictions on correspondence with persons outside the prison).
51. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974) (correspondence may be a vehicle for contraband); Feeley
v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 1978) (escape plans may be formulated through
the mails); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1977) (same).
52. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977).
53. See, e.g., Policies and Procedures, No. 16.2, § II A (State of Maine Dep't of Corrections, May 7, 1984) ("General correspondence is mail between an inmate and someone
other than those approved for privileged correspondence.").
54. See, e.g., Policies and Procedures, No. 16.1, § 3 (State of Maine Dep't of Corrections, May 30, 1986) ("Privileged Correspondence: Written communication from an inmate to elected officials, attorneys, persons within the judicial system, and government
officials.").
55. See supra note 53.
56. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
57. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941); Washington v. James, 782 F.2d
1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 1976); McDonough v. Director of Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189, 1192 (4th Cir. 1970) (citing Coleman v.
Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966)).
58. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 1976); McDonough v. Director
of Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189, 1192 (4th Cir. 1970).
59. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
60. See Taylor, 532 F.2d at 473-74; Pearson v. King, No. 81-1878, (D. Mass. June 18,
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with those persons or agencies directly involved with these prisoner
rights may not be read by prison officials. 6 Government agencies given
privileged correspondent status are those "with important and immediate
responsibility for the fact of an inmate's incarceration," 6 2 and include the
Justice Department,6 3 state or local prosecuting authorities," and probation or parole officers.65
The concept of privileged mail derives from Supreme Court reasoning
in Exparte Hull, decided in 1941.66 In Hull, the Court held that because
prison officials may not impair or abridge a prisoner's right of access to
courts, 67 prisoners retain the right to uninhibited written correspondence
with the courts. 68 Prisoners may use this right to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. 69 The availability of unimpeded written correspondence with these privileged sources 70 is essential to ensure
fair judicial proceedings. 7 1 It also provides a means by which unconstitutional prison conditions may be exposed.7 2
When mail is sent by a prisoner to a privileged correspondent, prison
officials may only ascertain whether such mail is correctly addressed, 7
because the opening of outgoing inmate mail to these persons or agencies
is not in furtherance of the substantial government interests involved in
prisons.7' "'[M]ail [addressed to privileged sources which contains] con1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 722 (D.
Conn. 1976); see also Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (establishing that prison officials may open privileged incoming mail and inspect it for contraband only in the inmate's presence; outgoing mail to privileged sources may not be
opened).
61. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974); Pearson v. King, No. 811878, (D. Mass. June 18, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Laannan v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977).
62. Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D. Conn. 1976).

63. See id.
64. See Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475; Stover, 413 F. Supp. at 723.
65. See Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1983); Taylor, 532 F.2d
at 475.
66. 312 U.S. 546 (1941); see Taylor, 532 F.2d 462, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1976).
In Hull, the Supreme Court invalidated a prison regulation allowing prison officials to
inspect legal documents addressed to the courts to determine whether they were properly
drafted. See Hull, 312 U.S. at 549. The Court ruled that this procedure abridged the
inmate's right of access to the courts. See iL
67. See Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.

68. See id
69. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).

70. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
71. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. See id at 471 ("'letters addressed to courts, public officials, or an attorney when a
prisoner challenges the... conditions of his incarceration' are '[s]ui generis in both logic
and the case law' ") (quoting Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) (en
banc), cert denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972)). The right of access to the courts is necessary to
contest the constitutionality of prison conditions. See i, at 472-73.
73. See id at 480.

74. See Davidson v. Scully, 694 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1982); Taylor, 532 F.2d at 473-
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traband or information about illegal activities will be treated by the recipients in a manner that cannot cause harm.' ,7 Thus, inmates are
permitted to seal outgoing mail to privileged correspondents before it is
sent to the prison mail clerk.7 6 Only a warrant based upon probable
cause to believe the correspondence contains evidence of illegal activity"
would permit prison officials to open such outgoing mail.78

Incoming mail from privileged sources may not be read by prison officials, but may be opened and inspected for contraband in the presence of
the inmate when external screening procedures are insufficient to detect
contraband. 79 The prisoner presence requirement prevents prison staff
from reading the privileged correspondence while ensuring prison
security. 8 °
75. Davidson, 694 F.2d at 53 (quoting Taylor, 532 F.2d at 474).
76. See Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Bureau of

Prisons Regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 540.2(c) (1981), which permits inmates to seal outgoing
"special mail"); see also Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1014 (5th Cir. 1979)
("[o]utgoing mail to ... licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials must be sent unopened"), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950 (1981); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 424 (7th
Cir. 1977) ("Jail personnel also spot-check the contents of all outgoing mail except 'privileged correspondence,' which may be sealed by the detainee prior to submission for
mailing.").
77. See, e.g., Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 1983) (evidence of
illegal activity through inmate mail includes threats and matters prohibited by law);
Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp.
114, 116 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (escape plans or plans to harm someone); Heimerle v. Attorney Gen., 575 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (threats and matters prohibited by
law may possibly be transmitted through inmate mail), rev'd on other grounds, 753 F.2d
10 (2d Cir. 1985); Cavey v. Levine, 435 F. Supp. 475, 483 (D. Md. 1977) (threats to, and
abuse of, former victims), aff'd sub nom. Cavey v. Williams, 580 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir.

1978).
78. See Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 759 (5th Cir. 1978) ("If [prison] officials
have reason to believe that a particular prisoner or [privileged source] is using the mail to

violate the law or threaten security, they may, upon a showing of probable cause, obtain a
search warrant to read and open the mail."); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) ("[I]f department personnel suspect some [privileged source] is aiding a resident in some illegal plan, they may hold the letter and obtain a search warrant.");
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (rules on treatment of inmate
mail are "subject to the Fourth Amendment, whereby, if the authorities satisfy its requirements, privileged mail may be searched and seized").
79. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974); Procunier v, Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 424-25 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206,
209 (6th Cir. 1983); Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981); see also
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1976) ("It is essential that prison officials have the discretion to open and inspect envelopes from any source when they feel
that external screening is insufficient to detect contraband."); Wash. Admin. Code § 13748-030 (1983) (mail touching on legal matters shall be inspected only in the presence of
the inmate and shall not be read without a search warrant); Admin. Regulations, No. 750
(State of Nevada Dep't of Prisons, Aug. 8, 1984) (requiring presence of inmate during
inspection of privileged correspondence).
External screening includes physical tests such as manipulation and fluoroscoping letters. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 424-25 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring);

Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392, 395 (D. Mass. 1971).
80. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974); Harrod v. Halford, 773 F.2d
234, 235 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1143 (1986);
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MEDIA MAIL SHOULD BE PRIVILEGED

Upon incarceration, prisoners totally forfeit some constitutional rights,
such as the right to associate, deemed inconsistent with the purposes of
the correctional system."' Prisoners, however, always retain certain
"fundamental" rights, 2 although these may be curtailed to address legitimate penological needs. 3 These rights include the freedom of speech
under the first amendment.8 4 Thus, it is not disputed that prison inmates
have the freedom under the first amendment to correspond with members of the media by mail. 5 In fact, prisoners' freedom and ability to
write letters is noted as an indispensable form of communication, 6 as

their telephone and visitation contact with those outside the confines of
the institution are drastically curtailed. 7 First amendment jurisprudence, however, dictates that reasonable restrictions on the time, place
and manner of the exercise of free speech are permissible, even in a free
society, if they further legitimate governmental interests.8" A balancing

Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1976); Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100,
1102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910 (1974).
81. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 285 (1948)). For example, prison officials may properly restrict a prisoner's right of
association and right to communicate by refusing to allow the prisoner to leave the institution temporarily to exercise these rights. See id. at 823.
82. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (eighth amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment is retained by the incarcerated); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (due process); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974) (due process and equal protection); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (freedom of religion); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (access to the courts); Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (equal protection of laws).
83. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974).
84. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("a prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system"); accord Safley v. Turner, 777
F.2d 1307, 1311 (8th Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987); Smith
v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1977). See generally, Note, PrisonMail Censorship
and the FirstAmendment, 81 Yale L.J. 87 (1971).
85. See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 547 (1st Cir. 1971) (prisoners retain "the
right to send letters to the press concerning prison matters").
86. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 426 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The mails provide one
of the few ties inmates retain to their communities or families-ties essential to the success of their later return to the outside world."); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 481 (5th
Cir. 1976) ("correspondence is a principal method available to prisoners to communicate
with private and public individuals or entities"); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199
(2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (" 'Letter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside
world, helps to hold in check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison
life and isolation, stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and otherwise may
make contributions to better mental attitudes and reformation.' ") (quoting Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) quoting Note, The Right of Expression in
Prison, 40 S.Cal. L. Rev. 418 (1967)), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
87. See e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-25 (1974) (visits curtailed); Wooden
v. Norris, 637 F. Supp. 543, 558 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (restrictions on telephone use);
Robinson v. Palmer, 619 F. Supp. 344, 348 (D.D.C. 1985) (restrictions on visitation).
88. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 826; cf, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17
(1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (acknowledging that the state has
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of these interests indicates that to avoid constitutional violations, written
correspondence between inmates and the media be classified as privileged
mail.
Disagreement exists over the proper classification of prisoner correspondence with the media for purposes of first amendment protection
from censorship. Is prisoner correspondence with the media to be privileged,89 or is such mail to be general correspondence that may be opened
and read by prison officials?9 ° The answer depends upon the application
of Pell and Martinez.9
A.

Martinez Test Mandates PrivilegedStatus For Media Mail

Those who advocate protection of media mail to and from prisoners
view the problem from the perspective of the correspondent, 92 following
the Supreme Court's approach to general correspondence in Procunierv.
Martinez.9 3 Accordingly, the censorship of media mail abridges the free
speech rights of media correspondents, 94 and this type of correspondence
should therefore be privileged. 95
When confronting censorship of prisoner correspondence with the media, courts should apply the Supreme Court's governmental-interest test
set forth in Procunierv. Martinez96 because it focuses on the interference
with the nonprisoner correspondent's right of free speech. 97 According
to the Martinez test, governmental interference with free speech of media
correspondents must be confined to the least intrusive methods necessary
the right to regulate and impose nondiscriminatory, reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on the use of city streets); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76
(1941) (upholding a state law requiring a licence to parade based on analysis of time,
place and manner considerations).
89. See Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 759 (5th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532
F.2d 462, 480-82 (5th Cir. 1976); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 116-17 (E.D. Mich.
1984).
90. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1986).
91. Compare Taylor, 532 F.2d at 480-81 (applying Supreme Court's tests in Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), from the standpoint of the inmates' first amendment
interests) with Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1307 (applying the alternative means test of Pell v.
Procunier,417 U.S. 817 (1974), and holding that media mail need not be given special
status since inmates have alternative means of communication with the public).
92. See Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 116-17 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
93. 416 U.S. 396, 407-09 (1974).
94. See, e.g., Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1978) (analyzing the
Texas Department of Corrections correspondence rules based upon "the limited situations in which prison regulations could have the effect of inhibiting the first amendment
rights of persons wishing to correspond with inmates"); Burton, 599 F. Supp. at 116
("The inspection of mail from residents to the media infringes on both the rights of residents and the press because it raises the possibility of censorship.").
95. See Burton, 599 F. Supp. at 117.
96. 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
97. See Burton, 599 F. Supp. at 116 ("The inspection of mail from [prison] residents
to the media infringes on both the rights of residents and the press because it raises the
possibility of censorship.") (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408).
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to protect legitimate government interests,98 established in light of the
special characteristics of the prison environment, 99 including high tension, confinement and aggressive feelings."0
The least restrictive means requirement of Martinez requires that outgoing media mail be protected from censorship. The risk that inmates
might be sending contraband to media representatives presents at best a
minimal concern to prison officials."' 1 Furthermore, a media correspondent is unlikely to become involved in escape plans or similar threats to
prison security. 0 2 Inmates therefore should be permitted to seal outgoing letters to the media. If, however, prison officials determine that a

particular inmate presents a higher security risk, that inmate can be required to have his outgoing mail inspected in his presence, but not read,
before it is sealed.'1 3 Therefore, permitting prison officials to read outgoing media mail exceeds the bounds of what is necessary to further these
interests. 1°4
Treatment of incoming media correspondence as privileged likewise
satisfies the Martinez test. Opening and inspecting the correspondence
98. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
99. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 837 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 424 (1974) (Marshall, J.,concurring); see also Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) ("Prisons, it is obvious,
differ in numerous respects from free society. They ...are populated, involuntarily, by
people who have been found to have violated one or more of the criminal laws established
by society for its orderly governance."); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974) (a
prison is a "closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to
violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so"); cf

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (applying First Amendment rights "in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment").
100. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562 (tension, frustration, resentment and despair characterize prison atmosphere); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 548 (Ist Cir. 1971) (aggressive feelings and grudges); Jackson v. Ward, 458 F. Supp. 546, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)
(penal confinement is restrictive).
101. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 424 (Marshall, J., concurring) (state's concern that contraband may be smuggled into prison through the mail does not justify reading outgoing
mail); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 1977) (conceding that "contraband
leaving the jail poses no substantial threat to [jail] security"); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451
F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1971) ("the communication which allegedly creates the danger to
security does so only when it returns to the prison"); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114,
116 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ("Contraband is certainly a serious problem in a correctional
setting, but the main problem is to keep it from entering, rather than leaving, the correctional facility.") (emphasis in original).
102. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
103. See Burton, 599 F. Supp. at 116 (rule requiring that media mail be sent unsealed
not applicable to all residents in segregation).
104. Other procedural precautions, such as verification procedures, may be necessary
to assure that the prisoner's correspondent actually is a member of the media. Cf Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) (finding a regulation requiring an attorney to
identify himself to prison authorities prior to correspdnding with an inmate, thereby permitting officials the opportunity to ascertain whether the correspondent is actually an
attorney, would not restrict any constitutional rights).
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for contraband in the prisoner's presence (to guarantee that the mail will

not be read) only when external screening proves insufficient-the treatment given to privileged mail--offers the least restrictive means of han-

dling incoming mail.1"5 In the case of prisoner correspondence with the
06
media, such restrictions do not compromise prison security or order.'
Contraband will be detected through inspection, 10 7 and it is unlikely that
incoming mail from media sources would contain any written material

that would jeopardize the security of the prison if left uncensored. 108
The alternative means test"°9 set forth in Pell v. Procunier," the case
in which the Supreme Court first faced the question of prisoner contact
with the media,"' has been interpreted to deny first amendment protection of media mail. 2 Pell holds that a prison regulation restricting nonwritten personal contact between certain inmates and members of the
media did not violate the first amendment rights of the inmates because
13
the inmates had access to the press through written correspondence."
The decision sets forth a test under which a prisoner's alternative means

of communication constitutes a factor to be considered in the balancing
of his first amendment rights against the governmental interests in prison
security, order and rehabilitation that underlie restrictions on prisoners'
communuication. 114
The alternative means recognized by the Pell Court was the availability of written correspondence with the press.I I' Because a prisoner could
write to members of the media, the regulation restricting his personal
contact with them did not abridge his freedom of speech under the first
amendment." 6 Moreover, the Court in Pell limited the use of the alter105. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
107. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 424-25 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 477 (5th Cir. 1976); see also supra note 80 and
accompanying text (incoming mail may be opened in presence of inmate).
108. See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1971) ("the danger that
newsmen will participate in escape attempts or assist in transferring contraband from one
prisoner to another, is based upon the dubious assumption that newsmen would be willing to cooperate in such projects"); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Mich.
1984) ("Media representatives, should they desire drugs for some reason, would hardly
look to residents in segregation as a source ....
Also, it is highly unlikely members of the
media would aid residents in segregation in an escape plan or in a plan to injure or kill
some individual.").
109. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
110. 417 U.S 817 (1974).
111. See id. at 819. Pell considered the constitutionality of a prison restriction prohibiting media interviews with specific individual inmates. See id.
112. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. See id. at 827-28.
114. See id. at 824, 826. According to the Court, "[s]o long as reasonable and effective
means of communication" between inmates and the media remain open, " 'prison officials
must be accorded latitude' " in restricting personal contact with these visitors. Id. at 826
(quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)).
115. See id. at 824.
116. See id. at 827 & n.5.
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native means test to review of claims by the incarcerated, because the
relationship between the state and prison inmates is "'more intimate
than that of a State and a private citizen.' "117 Thus the availability of
alternatives would not justify restrictions on first amendment rights of
unincarcerated citizens, the issue analgously dealt with in Martinez." 8
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit classified media mail as
general correspondence in Gaines v. Lane." 9 In doing so, the court applied the Pell test and found no abridgement of first amendment rights by
prison regulations that censor such mail,' 20 so long as alternative means
of communication with the general public are available. 2 ' This court
emphasized that the gravity of enforcing prison security justifies policies
to open and read incoming and outgoing media mail."12
In concluding that media mail should not be privileged,' 23 the Seventh
Circuit incorrectly approached the problem of prisoner-media correspondence. The Pell case must be distinguished from Gaines because in Pell
the Court used the availability of written correspondence to uphold a
regulation that restricted visitations by members of the media, 24 clearly
potentially more disruptive than the restriction of correspondence justified in Gaines.2 The Gaines decision makes no mention of the first
amendment rights of the media correspondents, ,26 and effectively ignores
the Supreme Court's analysis in Procunierv. Martinez.'"
Courts applying the Pell test must find an alternative form of communication to written media correspondence in order to allow censorship of
such correspondence without constitutional violation.' 2 8 The Seventh
Circuit recognizes prisoners' access to direct correspondence with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as an alternative
to media correspondence as a means of seeking redress of their griev117. Id. at 825-26 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973)).
118. See id. at 825.
119. 790 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1986).
120. See id. at 1306-07.
121. See id. An alternative means of communication between inmates and the general
public found in Pell was visitation with family members, the clergy, friends, and attorneys. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1974).
122. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-07 (7th Cir. 1986).
123. See id. at 1306-07.
124. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974).
125. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 480 (5th Cir. 1976). Taylor states:
A more important difference between Pell and this case is that here we are
dealing with correspondence rather than with press interviews. A press interview conducted in a prison with a specific inmate is an extraordinary mode of
communication. Correspondence with ... the press is, to the contrary, a singularly common means of communication.

Id.
126. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1306 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986).
127. See id. at 1303-07 (discussing Martinez but never applying the two-part analysis
to justify censorship of prisoner/media mail).
128. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1974); see e.g., Gaines, 790 F.2d at
1307.
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ances. 129 But the existence of this alternative does not address the fact
that the prison regulation restricting media mail abridges first amendment rights of the media correspondents. 130 Even assuming that the alternative means is an effective one, the effect of prison mail regulations

on the constitutional rights of the media correspondents still must be
confronted.
B.

The Press is a Special Category of Correspondents

The framers of the Constitution bestowed upon the press an unparal-

leled role as a vital source of public information.' 3 ' The function of reporting on the activities of government gave rise to the media's special
constitutional status, 132 based on the notion that "[o]nly a free and
unre33
strained press can effectively expose deception in government.'
Unrestrained reporting on government activity includes reporting on
3
the conditions and activities taking place in state penal institutions. ' 1
By informing the public about prison issues, the press educates society on
129. See Gaines, 790 F.2d at 1307.
130. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); see also Burton v. Foltz,
599 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ("In Martinez the Supreme Court described the
standard by which regulations limiting the use of the mail under the circumstances here
described [inspection of inmate mail sent to the media] should be judged").
131. See U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1978) (plurality opinion) (stating that "the role of the media is important; acting as the
'eyes and ears' of the public"); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)
("in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press
to bring to him in convenient form the facts of these operations"); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("An informed public depends
on accurate and effective reporting by the news media."); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
401 (1967) (the founders guaranteed "the press a favored spot in our free society"); Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("The Constitution specifically selected the press
... to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs.").
132. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,concurring); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
133. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("Suppression of the right of
the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or
against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution
thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.").
134. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality opinion) (while holding that media access was not mandated by the first amendment, the Court conceded that
the media fills the role of providing information concerning conditions in penal facilities);
KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 285, 296 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., concurring) ("The newsmen's function is to gather, to collate, and to transmit to a wide public
audience all of the information which the public is entitled to know about prison conditions."), rev'd on other grounds, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild,
Local No. 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The importance of the
media in providing public information about the conduct of [prisons] is undisputed.").
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a matter of public concern.' 35 Accurate disclosure of prison practices
fosters public awareness crucial to any reform or upgrading of the correctional system. 136 The press' special constitutional status ensures that
1 37
this function is fulfilled.
Unrestrained reporting, however, does not imply that the media is
completely free from governmental limitation.13 The news media has no
constitutional entitlement to information from which the general public
39
is excluded, such as the minutes of a prison administration meeting.'
Yet because the media's need for access to information is distinguishable
from that of the remainder of society,'t o governmental restriction on its
operation cannot be severe.' 41 There are less restrictive means of regulating news media access to prisoners than censorship of their correspondence. 142 Thus, it is improper and unwise to allow prisoner
correspondence with members of the media to be censored as general
correspondence.

C. Chilling Effect by Censorship of Media Mail

Because prison issues are important matters of public interest on
135. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8 ("conditions in jails and prisons are clearly matters
'of great public importance' ") (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 n.7 (1974)).
The Supreme Court in Houchins stated that "[p]enal facilities are public institutions
which require large amounts of public funds, and their mission is crucial in our criminal
justice system. Each person placed in prison becomes, in effect, a ward of the state for
whom society assumes broad responsibility." 1d.; see also Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper
Guild, Local No. 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Decisions recognizing 'the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning
public officials, their servants,' are equally applicable in the realm of prison administration.") (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451
F.2d 545, 547 (Ist Cir. 1971) ("the conditions of our prisons is an important matter of
public policy").
136. Cf Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8 (media "can be a powerful and constructive force,
contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public business"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (referring to trial publicity, the Court stated: "The press
does not simply publish information . . . but guards against the miscarriage of justice. . . ."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("the press serves and was
designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials"); Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local No. 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1066
(9th Cir. 1973) ("it has often been through the zealous efforts of the news media that
failures in a particular institution have been exposed").
137. Cf New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, I.,
concurring) ("In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.").
138. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("like all
other components of our society media representatives are subject to limits").
139. See, eg., KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 296 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler,
J., concurring specially), rev'd on other grounds, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
140. See id. at 286 ("The access needs of the news media and the public differ. Media
access, on reasonable notice, may be desirable in the wake of a newsworthy event .... ").
141. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941) ("the unqualified prohibitions
laid down by the framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other
liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society").
142. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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which prisoners are uniquely qualified to report, 143 prisoners should not
be discouraged from speaking out on prison conditions and the conduct
of prison officials. The failure to include inmate-media correspondence
in the protected category of privileged mail, however, may produce such
a "chilling effect" 1" on the freedom
of speech enjoyed by both inmates
14 5
and their media correspondents.
Aware that nonprivileged mail is inspected and read outside their presence, prisoners may fear reprisal if they criticize prison officials in their
writings to the media. 146 As a result, they may temper or limit their
criticisms.147 This inhibits the free flow of information that underlies the
freedom of speech of both prisoners and their correspondents. 14 8 Morecan be
over, the valuable information concerning prison conditions that
49
suppressed.
be
will
press
the
to
letters
inmate
from
obtained
Protection of inmate-media mail, in contrast, will ensure that inmate
grievances will be conveyed to the public freely and accurately.150 The
public will receive the information necessary to monitor prison condi143. See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 547 (1st Cir. 1971); O'Connell v. Southworth, 422 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D.R.I. 1976) (citing Nolan, 451 F.2d at 547); Burnham v.
Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 885 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (same).
144. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 423 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("A prisoner's free and open expression will surely be restrained by the knowledge that
his every word may be read by his jailors and that his message could well find its way into
a disciplinary file, be the object of ridicule, or even lead to reprisals.").
145. See id., 416 U.S. at 423-27 ("A similar pall may be cast over the free expression of
the inmates' correspondents."); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that the restriction at issue in Martinez denied the prisoner's correspondent effective communication by chilling that communication); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp.
114, 116 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ("The inspection of mail from residents to the media infringes on both the rights of residents and the press because it raises the possibility of
censorship."); Heimerle v. Attorney Gen., 575 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
("even the reading of mail implicates First Amendment interests because it exerts a potentially chilling effect upon the freedom of expression of the inmates and their correspondents"), rev'd on other grounds, 753 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1985).
146. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 476 (5th Cir. 1976); Travis v. Lockhart, No.
84-309 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 18, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (quoting Martinez,
416 U.S. at 424), aff'd, 787 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1986)(per curiam); Burton v. Foltz, 599 F.
Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1984); see also, Cavey v. Levine, 435 F. Supp. 475, 481 (D.
Md. 1977) (disciplinary proceedings brought against inmate for sending correspondence
violated the first amendment rights of both the inmate and his correspondent), aff'd sub
nom. Cavey v. Williams, 580 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Supreme Court has recognized generally that the threat of sanctions can chill
constitutional rights. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 423 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Domconcurring); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 222 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963).
147. See Travis v. Lockhart, No. 84-309 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 18, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (the prison's reading media mail results in suppression of criticism of
prisons and prison officials), aff'd, 787 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974) ("[T]he ability to open the mail
in the presence of inmates ... in no way constitute[s] censorship, since the mail would
not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmate's presence
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tions, and the free flow of expression under the first amendment will not
be impeded.
CONCLUSION

It is well settled that security, order and rehabilitation represent legitimate governmental interests that limit constitutional freedoms in a
prison setting. At the same time, inmates, as well as their nonprisoner
correspondents, retain constitutional rights that must be protected from
unnecessary interference. In order to balance these competing interests,
the Supreme Court developed the governmental-interest and least-restrictive-means tests in Procunierv. Martinez."'5
When the governmental restriction appears in the form of regulation
of prisoner correspondence with members of the media, the least restrictive means to further the government's interest in prisons without abridging the first amendment rights of these nonprisoner correspondents is to
treat such mail as privileged correspondence. Because the possible contents of media correspondence are not likely to be used to cause harm,
this approach does not put prison security, order, or rehabiliation at risk.
Moreover, as a special class of correspondents, the press must be afforded
an opportunity to report on prison activities, as such activities constitute
a matter of public concern. Finally, censorship of inmate-media mail
may produce a "chilling effect" on both prisoners and their correspondents, resulting in the suppression of information that necessarily must
flow freely in order for the debate over institutional conditions to remain
in the public arena.
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
insures that prison officials will not read the mail."); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475
(5th Cir. 1976) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577 (1974)).
151. 416 U.S. 396 (1974); see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.

